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Quantum computers are expected to offer substantial speedups over their classical counterparts
and to solve problems that are intractable for classical computers. Beyond such practical signifi-
cance, the concept of quantum computation opens up new fundamental questions, among them the
issue whether or not quantum computations can be certified by entities that are inherently unable
to compute the results themselves. Here we present the first experimental verification of quantum
computations. We show, in theory and in experiment, how a verifier with minimal quantum re-
sources can test a significantly more powerful quantum computer. The new verification protocol
introduced in this work utilizes the framework of blind quantum computing and is independent of
the experimental quantum-computation platform used. In our scheme, the verifier is only required
to generate single qubits and transmit them to the quantum computer. We experimentally demon-
strate this protocol using four photonic qubits and show how the verifier can test the computer’s
ability to perform measurement-based quantum computations.
The prevalent scientific paradigm of testing physical
theories by comparing experimental results with predic-
tions computed on a piece of paper or on a computer
assumes that all such predictions are solvable in poly-
nomial time on a classical computer. In current experi-
ments involving quantum particles, such as fundamental
tests of quantum mechanics or small-scale quantum com-
putations and simulations [1–5], following this paradigm
is still possible, as the results can be calculated on a
classical computer and verified in experiments involving
quantum systems. However, there is an entire class of
problems—for example, the simulation of complex quan-
tum systems [6]—that are solvable in polynomial time
only on a quantum computer [7].
One of the central conceptual questions in current
quantum computing is therefore whether any entity can
test the results obtained by a quantum computer, even
when that entity is unable to compute these results it-
self. Or, from a different perspective, can an experimen-
talist with only classical resources or restricted quantum
resources prove that a given device is a quantum com-
puter [8]? Whereas the ultimate answer to such questions
is still open, there are several proposals that offer a solu-
tion when the verifier is equipped with a range of quan-
tum resources [9–14]—quantum memory, two entangled
quantum computers, or a large number of qubits—which,
however, are outside the reach of current technology.
Here, we demonstrate how to verify a quantum com-
putation on four qubits. Our method is directly applica-
ble to current technology and can be readily extended to
more general cases. We show that only minimal quan-
tum resources (specifically, single qubits) are required to
certify a quantum-information processor. Our protocol is
independent of the physical system on which it is imple-
mented and it can therefore be applied to any quantum-
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FIG. 1: Concept of a quantum prover interactive proof system
based on blind quantum computing. The verifier wants to find
out if the prover can indeed perform quantum computations.
While the question of whether a classical verifier can test a
quantum system is still open, it was shown that a verifier who
has access to certain quantum resources can verify quantum
computations. Here, in the framework of blind quantum com-
puting, the verifier has to be able to generate single qubits and
to transmit them to the prover. After the transmission of the
qubits, the verifier and the prover exchange two-way classical
communication.
computing platform.
We have implemented the new protocol on a photonic
quantum system and demonstrate the necessary compo-
nents for verifying a quantum device. We also show how
our scheme can be used to verify the generation of the
archetype of a quantum-computational resource, quan-
tum entanglement, via a violation of Bell’s inequality. In
such a verification, the prover remains blind and can-
not distinguish the verification procedure from standard
quantum-computational tasks such as single- or multi-
qubit gates or entire quantum algorithms. To the best
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2of our knowledge, this is the first experiment towards
certifying the correctness of a quantum computation.
INTERACTIVE PROOF SYSTEMS AND BLIND
QUANTUM COMPUTING
Our protocol combines interactive proof systems and
blind quantum computing [9–11]. Interactive proof sys-
tems were originally invented in the field of computer sci-
ence, to approach questions in classical complexity the-
ory [15, 16]. They have since been extended into the
realm of quantum computation [7]. A quantum prover in-
teractive proof system addresses the question of whether
a prover who has access to quantum-computational re-
sources can convince a classical verifier that he can solve a
given problem. Interactive proof systems can therefore be
used to address the fundamental questions posed above,
provided the traditional scientific paradigm of “predict-
ing” is replaced by “verifying”.
In our protocol, the framework of the interactive proof
system is given by blind quantum computing (Fig. 1). In
this framework, a verifier (or client) with limited quan-
tum computational resources can delegate a quantum
computation to a prover (or server) with the full power
of quantum computing such that all data and the whole
computation remain private [10, 17]. More specifically,
the verifier prepares single qubits in the state
|θj〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiθj |1〉) (1)
with θj ∈ {0, pi/4, ..., 7pi/4} chosen uniformly at random
and only known to the verifier. The qubits are then
transmitted to the prover who entangles them to cre-
ate a blind cluster state [18]. The actual computation is
measurement-based [19, 20]. The verifier calculates for
each blind qubit measurement instructions according to
δj = θj + φj + pirj (2)
where θj is the blind phase of the qubit, φj is the rotation
that the verifier wants to perform (including any Pauli
corrections), and rj ∈ {0, 1} is a randomly chosen value
to hide the measurement outcome. The prover performs
measurements in the basis
|±δj 〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± eiδj |1〉) (3)
and delivers the results to the verifier. Without the
knowledge of the underlying rotation and the random
phase, the prover cannot find out anything about the ac-
tual rotation φj—thus the computation remains blind.
The verifier, in contrast, knows the initial rotation and is
able to interpret the results. Blind quantum computing
therefore provides a powerful tool to delegate computa-
tions and to access the resources of powerful quantum
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FIG. 2: Measurement verification. a,b) A blind linear cluster
state and a blind rotated horseshoe cluster state which can
be used for the preparation of trap qubits. c) Experimental
results of the measurement verification. We prepare two dif-
ferent trap state on each qubit 1-4 and show the probability of
obtaining the correct outcome when measuring those qubits.
computers without divulging the content of the compu-
tation. In the following, we show how this concept can
be applied to verify quantum computations.
VERIFICATION OF A QUANTUM
COMPUTATION
In the framework of blind quantum computing, in or-
der to test a quantum computation, the correctness of the
measurements performed by the server has to be verified.
Here we use a verification procedure that is based on the
creation of trap qubits [12]. Trap qubits are blindly pre-
pared in a well-defined state, which is only known to the
verifier, and are isolated from the actual computation.
The measurement angle of these trap qubits is chosen
such that the measurement result is predetermined by
the verifier, and hence any cheating strategy used by the
server that alters these measurement outcomes will be de-
tected. By randomly choosing the locations of the trap
qubits it is then possible to bound the probability that
the server can cheat while remaining undetected.
In our setting, we implement the preparation of the
trap qubits through a measurement-based computation
on the non-trap qubits. The verifier chooses measure-
ment settings on the cluster state such that any of the
qubits could become a trap qubit, prepared in a random
state |θj〉. If the trap qubit is then measured in the ba-
sis |θj〉, the outcome will always be known to the verifier
(see Fig. 2). Our measurement-based creation of the trap
qubits means that we verify a correlation between a sub-
set of measurements, rather than a single measurement
outcome. We therefore have to be careful to ensure that
the correctness of these correlations for all trap measure-
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FIG. 3: Schematic of a quantum computation with verifica-
tion sub-routines.
ments does imply the correctness of a given computa-
tional run. In our demonstration using a four-qubit sys-
tem, only one error remains undetected (see Appendix).
However, this particular error cannot alter the result of
the measurement of Bell’s quantity presented in this pa-
per.
This verification procedure can be used to verify
that the quantum computation was performed correctly.
Therefore, we consider multiple runs of the protocol,
where the verifier randomly choses to run an actual com-
putation or a verification test (see Fig. 3). This use of
multiple runs of the blind-computation protocol lets us
make optimal use of the qubits available in our system.
Moreover, the server cannot distinguish between an ac-
tual computation run or a trap run. Hence, as discussed
in details in the appendix, this procedure can be used
to verify not only the correctness of the measurement
outcomes but also of the entire quantum computation.
When trap computation and target computation are ran-
domly interspersed, then the probability that the quan-
tum computer produces the correct result for the verifica-
tion runs but a wrong result for the computation runs is
bounded by a value depending on three parameters: the
number of computation runs, the number of trap runs,
and on the total number of qubits in the system (see
appendix).
ENTANGLEMENT VERIFICATION
Once the measurement outcomes are verified, we can
proceed to use the system to probe the prover’s entan-
gling capabilities and its ability to create cluster states.
Quantum correlations are typically confirmed by well-
established tests of Bell’s inequality [21] (Fig. 4). In order
to do so, combinations of specific measurement settings
α, α′ and β, β′ are performed on the first (a) and on the
second qubit (b), respectively, after generating an entan-
gled state |Ψ〉a,b. The settings are chosen such that a
maximal violation of the Bell inequality of the Clauser-
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FIG. 4: A blind Bell test for the verification of quantum re-
sources. a) Conventional scheme for a Bell test, where first an
(entangled) state is created and then Bell measurements are
performed. b) The blind zigzag cluster state, and c) its corre-
sponding circuit. If the rotation in the lower wire, −δ4+θ4, is
chosen equal to zero (or pi), the input state in the lower wire
will be equal to |0〉b (|1〉b); otherwise, if the rotation is cho-
sen equal to ±pi/2 the input will be |±i〉b. The edge between
qubits 2 and 3 performs a CPhase gate on the two qubits,
which results in an entangled state in the former case, and in
an unentangled state in the latter. The values of δ1, δ2, and
δ3, as well as the phases θ1, θ2, and θ3 determine the Bell
measurement settings.
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) type [22] is obtained for an
entangled state:
S = |E(α, β)−E(α, β′)|+ |E(α′, β)+E(α′, β′)| ≤ 2 (4)
The correlation coefficients E(·, ·) are defined by the co-
incidence counts when measuring qubit a in the basis α
and qubit b in the basis β (for details see appendix).
In order to make the Bell test blind, we hide the gener-
ation of the entangled state as well as the Bell measure-
ment settings. For this, we base our implementation on
a blind zigzag cluster state with four qubits |θj〉, which
is shown in Fig. 4b. Single-qubit measurements on the
blind zigzag cluster state realize a quantum circuit that
offers exactly the degrees of freedom that are necessary
for our blind Bell test. First, using this type of cluster,
the verifier has the possibility to blindly switch between
entangled or separable input states by choosing δ4 and
θ4 accordingly. Second, the standard measurement set-
tings for a Bell test are hidden as they are determined
by the phases of the blind qubits |θ1〉, |θ2〉, and |θ3〉 and
their respective measurement settings of δ1, δ2, and δ3
(see appendix for details).
As a result, the state generation as well as the Bell-
state measurements are encoded in the phase of blind
qubits as well as in the measurement instructions, which
remain unknown to the prover at any time. The choice of
the cluster-state configuration also remains hidden from
the prover. This is a particular advantage of our prob-
abilistic implementation of blind quantum computing,
where all qubits are measured.
4EXPERIMENT
We use the particular advantages offered by photons
to realize a quantum network that can communicate and
process quantum information [23] within the same phys-
ical system [18]. In our experiment, the blind cluster
states are generated from photon pairs entangled in po-
larization and mode, which originate from spontaneous
parametric down-conversion [24]. Our setup and the
methods used are explained in detail in ref. 10; in the
present experiment, we generate blind cluster states for
various settings of θj and use them to implement exem-
plary runs of trap computations as well as the Bell-test
runs—the necessary building blocks of a verified test of
Bell’s quantity.
For the demonstration of the measurement verification,
we use blind linear cluster states and blind rotated horse-
shoe cluster state to prepare traps as shown in Fig. 2a
and 2b. By choosing the blind phases θj and measure-
ment settings δj as given in the appendix, we prepare the
traps:
|trap1〉 = |−i〉 and |+〉 (5)
|trap2〉 = |+〉 and |+i〉 (6)
|trap3〉 = Rz(3pi/4)|+〉 and Rz(pi/4)|+〉 (7)
|trap4〉 = |−〉 and |−i〉 (8)
on qubits 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively (|±〉 = (|0〉 ±
|1〉)/√2, |±i〉 = (|0〉 ± i|1〉)/
√
2). The probabilities to
find the correct outcome are well above 90%, as shown
in Fig. 2c.
For a verification of quantum entanglement, we choose
combinations of θ4 and δ4 to create the entangled state:
|Ψ〉a,b = 1√
2
(|+〉a|0〉b − i|−〉a|1〉b) (9)
and to blindly implement the Bell measurements settings
we choose:
α = pi/2, α′ = σz, β = −3pi/4, β′ = −pi/4 (10)
where the bases α, β, and β′ are defined as {(|0〉 ±
eiα|1〉)/√2} etc., and α′ is a measurement in the basis
{|0〉, |1〉}. To obtain the measurement settings given in
Eq. (10), we choose combinations of |θj〉 and δj as given in
detail in the appendix. From the measured coincidence
count rates, we calculate the correlation coefficients to
be:
E(α, β) = −0.540± 0.084 (11)
E(α, β′) = 0.634± 0.086 (12)
E(α′, β) = −0.646± 0.067 (13)
E(α′, β′) = −0.678± 0.079. (14)
Those coefficients lead to an S parameter of
S = 2.498± 0.158, (15)
which violates the classical bound (|S| = 2) by more than
3 standard deviations.
The combination of the verification procedure and this
violation of Bell’s inequality suffices to unambiguously
verify the prover’s ability to perform entangling gates
between qubits and thus to create cluster states. In our
experiment, we implement a subset of all possible blind
states. The states of qubits 1 and 4 are fixed to |+〉,
whereas the states of qubits 2 and 3 are fully blind [18].
The whole verification procedure remains blind, however,
if we assume that the prover has no a priori knowledge
of our choice of states and measurements.
The violation of Bell’s inequalities is impossible classi-
cally, not for the reason of high complexity, but rather on
the basis of physical principles. In our implementation,
we assume the correctness of quantum mechanics for the
verification of the measurement outcomes. Without this
assumption, a full demonstration would require the two
entangled photons to be sent to two distant laboratories,
where only at the very last step of the computation the
verifier gives the measurement instructions to the prover.
In this way, no classical computer could mimic, even in
principle the output of the computation a priori, while
the verification procedure would still have a positive out-
come.
CONCLUSION
Future large-scale quantum computers and quantum
simulators [25–28] will require the verification of their
experimental results [29]. Due to the superior compu-
tational capacity of quantum systems the results can-
not simply be calculated and checked on a classical de-
vice. The development of new methods for the verifi-
cation of quantum computations is therefore a crucial
task. Here, we have developed a new general method
for verifying quantum computations that can be readily
applied to current small-scale quantum computers. We
have shown, in theory and in experiment, how a verifier
can test whether the quantum computer is quantum and
even whether it computes correctly.
Finally, how verification mechanisms provide insights
into questions of computational complexity and into the
foundations of quantum physics it is a topic of active cur-
rent research. To date, the limit of high computational
complexity is mostly unexplored and it is not impossible
that quantum mechanics breaks down at some scale of
complexity [30].
Verification methods, such as those reported here in are
not only important as a mechanism to certify quantum
computers, but also provides an entirely novel toolbox
for addressing fundamental questions in quantum physics
and computer science.
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6APPENDIX
VERIFICATION OF A QUANTUM COMPUTATION
In order to verify a blind quantum computation, it is necessary to ensure that the probability of an undetected error
being introduced to the computation is bounded. One way to do this is to introduce trap qubits into the computation
as in [12]. To prove that this does in fact guarantee that any error is either detected or corrected except with bounded
probability, we must consider the most general possible cheating strategy for the prover. Thus we must consider the
effect of an arbitrary deviation at each step of the protocol. In this section we present a simplified version of the proof
in [12] adapted to our 4-qubit protocol with classical inputs and outputs, and then show how it can be adapted to
work with traps prepared by measurement-based computation.
Individual trap qubits
We assume the most general scenario. The prover obtains the quantum states |θi〉 and the states |δi〉 which encode
the classical angles δi. Further, the prover has access to a private quantum memory |Prover〉, where the prover could
store quantum information allowing him to perform the most general attacks:
|θ1〉
B1
B2
b1
|θ2〉
B3
b2
|θ3〉
B4
b3
|θ4〉
B5
b4
|Prover〉
|δ1〉
|δ2〉
|δ3〉
|δ4〉
Here, {Bi} are the individual operations performed by the prover and bi is the outcome of a measurement always
performed in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Without loss of generality we can assume that the measurement occurs immediately
prior to transmission of each bit to the verifier, as shown above. Mathematically, the individual operations performed
by the prover, {Bi} can be combined into a single operation B, resulting in the quantum circuit shown below.
|θ1〉
B
b1
|θ2〉 b2
|θ3〉 b3
|θ4〉 b4
|Prover〉
|δ1〉
|δ2〉
|δ3〉
|δ4〉
By defining B′ = BP †, where P corresponds to the unitary implementing the protocol for an honest prover, the
7circuit corresponding to the protocol can be rewritten as the ideal protocol followed by some deviation.
|θ1〉
P B′
b1
|θ2〉 b2
|θ3〉 b3
|θ4〉 b4
|Prover〉
|δ1〉
|δ2〉
|δ3〉
|δ4〉
The verifier’s output only corresponds to the measurement outputs received from the prover, and so the prover’s
effective deviation operator can be reduced to a super-operator, dependent on the specific values of {δi} used in that
run of the protocol, acting only on these qubits.
|θ1〉
Pδ B
′
δ
b1
|θ2〉 b2
|θ3〉 b3
|θ4〉 b4
As the left hand part of the above circuit implements the ideal protocol, B′δ contains any error introduced by the
prover.
Note that the output of the ideal protocol b = {bi} is the output of the verifier’s chosen computation, m = {mi},
bitwise xored with a random bitstring, r = {ri}, known only to the verifier:
b = m⊕ r.
In the following, we encode the classical information in a quantum system:
b → |b〉,
m → |m〉,
r → |r〉, and
(m⊕ r) → |m⊕ r〉,
thus n classical bits are encoded in n qubits.
Therefore, for a fixed computation chosen by the verifier with outcome m, on n qubits, the probability of an error
occurring (averaging over all possible choices for the random bitstring r) is given by
 =
1
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
Tr [ (I2n − |m+ r〉〈m+ r|) B′δ (|m+ r〉〈m+ r|)] ,
=
1
2n
∑
b∈{0,1}n
Tr [ (I2n − |b〉〈b|) B′δ (|b〉〈b|)] ,
for a fixed computation. Here, n is the number of qubits involved in the protocol and I2n is the 2n-dimensional density
matrix.
Note, however, that for a trap located on any measured qubit i for which the expected measurement outcome is ri,
the probability of the trap registering an error is:
ti,ri = Tr
[
(I2n − I2i−1 ⊗ |ri〉〈ri| ⊗ I2n−i)B′δ
(
I2i−1
2i−1
⊗ |ri〉〈ri| ⊗ I2n−i
2n−i
)]
,
8where |ri〉 a 2-dimensional quantum state encoding the classical value ri. Here, we use the fact that for a measurement
of a trap qubit we expect mi = 0, and thus ri = bi.
Averaging over all possible choices of i and ri, this yields an average probability of detection of
〈t〉 =
n∑
i=1
1
n
∑
b∈{0,1}n
1
2n
Tr [(I2n − I2i−1 ⊗ |bi〉〈bi| ⊗ I2n−i)B′δ (|b〉〈b|)]
=
1
n 2n
∑
b∈{0,1}n
Tr
[(
n∑
i=1
(I2n − I2i−1 ⊗ |bi〉〈bi| ⊗ I2n−i)
)
B′δ (|b〉〈b|)
]
,
where |bi〉i a 2-dimensional quantum state encoding the classical value bi.
As the B′δ (|b〉〈b|) is positive semi-definite, and
(I2n − |b〉〈b|) 
n∑
i=1
(I2n − |bi〉i〈bi|i) ,
then
〈t〉 ≥ 2
−n
n
∑
b∈{0,1}n
Tr [(I2n − |b〉〈b|)B′δ (|b〉〈b|)]
where bi is the ith bit of b. Thus, by substituting in  into the above equation and rearranging, we obtain  ≤ n〈t〉.
Traps prepared by MBQC
Contrary to the protocol described in [12], in the current experiment we rely on measurement-based computation
to prepare isolated trap qubits (instead of preparing them directly). For example to prepare qubit 4 as a trap qubit,
we choose a blind linear cluster state which implements the following computation:
|trap4〉 = Rz (θ4)HRz (m3pi)HRz
(pi
2
+m2pi
)
HRz
(pi
2
+m1pi
)
|+〉.
The output state |trap4〉 then depends on the outcomes of the measurement of qubit 1, 2 and 3 which are blind to
the prover.
The general measurement patterns which can achieve such isolated trap qubits, together with the corresponding
state of the trap qubit prepared are shown in Table I.
Trap qubit Measurements Trap state
1 2 3 4
1 σ Y Y |+(m3⊕m4)pi〉
2 Y X Y |+(m1⊕m3⊕m4)pi〉
3 Y X Y |+(m1⊕m2⊕m4)pi〉
4 Y Y σ |+(m1⊕m2)pi〉
TABLE I: Measurement choices for non-trap qubits which prepare isolated trap qubits at each location. Note that if the choice
of measurement operator for a given qubit does not affect the outcome then the measurement has been denoted by σ.
In order to determine the affect of a cheating prover, it is convenient to note that each of these trap measurements
can also be interpreted as a stabilizer measurement of the underlying cluster state, as shown in Table II. Table
III gives the cluster state measurement angles φ and sample corresponding pairs of blind state preparation and
measurement angles (θ, δ), together with the classical computation performed in each case to verify the outcome of
the trap measurement.
As in the previous section, a general deviation by the prover can be modeled by the quantum circuit below.
|ψ1〉
Pδ B
′
δ
b1
|ψ2〉 b2
|ψ3〉 b3
|ψ4〉 b4
9Trap qubit Stabilizer
1 X ⊗ I⊗ Y ⊗ Y
2 Y ⊗X ⊗X ⊗ Y
3 Y ⊗X ⊗X ⊗ Y
4 Y ⊗ Y ⊗ I⊗X
TABLE II: Index of trap qubit and corresponding stabilizer measurement.
Trap qubit φ Sample (θi, δi) Trap outcome
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 pi
2
pi
2
(0, 0)
(
pi
2
,−pi
2
) (
3pi
4
, 5pi
4
) (
0, pi
2
)
m1 ⊕m3 ⊕m4
2 pi
2
0 0 pi
2
(
0, pi
2
) (
pi
2
, pi
2
) (
3pi
4
, 7pi
4
) (
0, pi
2
)
m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m4
3 pi
2
0 0 pi
2
(
0, pi
2
) (
pi
2
, pi
2
) (
3pi
4
, 7pi
4
) (
0, pi
2
)
m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m4
4 pi
2
pi
2
0 0
(
0,−pi
2
) (
pi
2
, 0
)
(pi, 0) (0,0) m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m4
TABLE III: Measurement angle for each trap setting together with sample δ and θ. The trap outcome should be consistent
with the equation in the right most column in the above table, and any discrepancy represents the detection of an error.
Equivalently this can be rewritten as
|+〉
G
RZ(φ1) H
B′′δ
b1
|+〉 RZ(φ2) H b2
|+〉 RZ(φ3) H b3
|+〉 RZ(φ4) H b4
Here, the left hand portion of the circuit performs the unitary part of the ideal measurement-based computation,
immediately prior to measurement in the computational basis, with G representing the entangling gate which generates
the cluster state from separable qubits via a series of controlled-Z operations. The deviation operator B′′δ can be
expanded as a sum over Kraus operators, {χkδ}, acting on the density matrix.
Next, χkδ can be expanded as a sum over 4-qubit Pauli operators (including the identity), {σi}, weighted by
complex coefficients, so that χkδ =
∑
wki σi, with w
k
i ∈ C and
∑
k
∑
i w
k
i w
k∗
i = 1. Table IV shows whether a given
Pauli term in the deviation operator commutes or anticommutes with each trap setting, and hence whether such an
error is detectable or not. We note that the only Pauli terms which commute with the measurement and terms which
correspond to a simultaneous bit-flip error on only the first and last qubits remain undetected. The first set of terms
leave the computation unaltered, and hence do not represent errors. However the latter group do represent an error
which cannot be detected by our current setup.
While this appears to be an insurmountable problem if we wish to verify a general quantum computation, the
problem disappears entirely if we consider only those computations for which the output of the computation only
depends on the parity of the measurement results of qubits 1 and 4. This is because flipping both measurement
outcomes leaves their parity invariant, and hence the outcome of the computation remains the same. Thus for the
remainder of this section we consider only those computations for which simultaneously flipping the first and last
measurement results leave the outcome of the computation invariant.
With this restriction in place, we take the verification protocol to proceed as follows. First the verifier randomly
chooses whether or not to perform a computation as normal or instead to perform a trap computation. We assume
that a trap computation is chosen with probability p. Next the verifier chooses uniformly at random an index for the
trap qubit. As traps 2 and 3 correspond to the same stabilizer measurement we would obtain a better probability of
detecting an error by choosing between the three stabilizer measurements uniformly at random. However, here we
10
Pauli (σi) Trap Stabilizer Measurement Overall
X ⊗ I⊗ Y ⊗ Y Y ⊗X ⊗X ⊗ Y Y ⊗ Y ⊗ I⊗X
C ⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗ C 3 3 3 3
C ⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗A 7 7 7 7
C ⊗ C ⊗A⊗ C 7 7 3 7
C ⊗ C ⊗A⊗A 3 3 7 7
C ⊗A⊗ C ⊗ C 3 7 7 7
C ⊗A⊗ C ⊗A 7 3 3 7
C ⊗A⊗A⊗ C 7 3 7 7
C ⊗A⊗A⊗A 3 7 3 7
A⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗ C 7 7 7 7
A⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗A 3 3 3 3
A⊗ C ⊗A⊗ C 3 3 7 7
A⊗ C ⊗A⊗A 7 7 3 7
A⊗A⊗ C ⊗ C 7 3 3 7
A⊗A⊗ C ⊗A 3 7 7 7
A⊗A⊗A⊗ C 3 7 3 7
A⊗A⊗A⊗A 7 3 7 7
TABLE IV: Pauli terms in the deviation operator B′′δ and whether or not they are detected by a particular trap setup or not.
Although there are 256 distinct 4-qubit Pauli operators, including the identity, these can be grouped into 16 distinct sets based
on whether each local term commutes (C ∈ {I, Z}) or anticommutes (A ∈ {X,Y }) with the computational basis measurement
carried out immediately after the deviation operator acts. Note that all such terms are either leave the computation invariant,
or are detected by at least one trap setting, with the exception of A⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗A.
use an identical probability for choosing each trap index, since this is optimal in the case where our experimental
restrictions are limited and we can employ the full protocol of [12].
We wish to bound the probability that a given run of the computation yields the correct results based on the
probability of trap computations yielding incorrect results. To do this, we note that for the set of computations we
consider, any Pauli term in B′′δ which leads to an error in the outcome of the computation necessarily anticommutes
with at least one of the trap stabilizer measurements and hence is detected with probability at least p/4. Thus
any deviation which flips at least one of the measurement outcomes is detected with probability at least p/4. If
the probability that a malicious prover flips one or more measurement outcomes is , then the probability that a
trap computation yields the correct result is 〈t〉 ≥ p/4. Thus the probability that the outcome of a computation is
incorrect is bounded from above by  ≤ 4〈t〉p .
We note that in order for the above verification procedure to work, it is necessary for all qubits to be fully blind
(i.e. all possible choices of θ and δ from {0, pi4 , pi2 , 3pi4 , pi, 5pi4 , 3pi2 , 7pi4 } should be possible for each qubit). In the current
generation of experiments this property holds only for qubits 2 and 3, and the value for δ1 and δ4 are fixed. However
we note that these fixed values do represent a legitimate choice on the part of the verifier, and as long as the prover
does not have a priori information about this restriction the proof of authentication holds.
Experimental settings
In our experiment, we choose the set of phases and measurement setting as given in Table V to prepare traps on
all qubits:
ENTANGLEMENT VERIFICATION
As discussed in the main paper we demonstrate how our restricted verification scheme can be exploited for the
verification of a non-classical computation, in the form of a measurement of Bell statistics. For a test of Bell’s
inequality, the certain measurements α, α′ and β, β′ need to be performed on a two-qubit state |ψ〉a,b, where α, α′
(β, β′) are the measurements performed on qubit a (b). If the state |ψ〉a,b is entangled, a maximal violation of the
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|trap1〉 = |−i〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 0, θ4 = 0
δ1 = δtrap, δ2 = −pi/2, δ3 = pi, δ4 = −pi/2
|trap1〉 = |+〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 3pi/2, θ4 = 0
δ1 = δtrap, δ2 = −pi/2, δ3 = 5pi/4, δ4 = pi/2
|trap2〉 = |+〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = pi, θ4 = 0
δ1 = −pi/2, δ2 = δtrap, δ3 = 0, δ4 = 0
|trap2〉 = |+i〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0, θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi/2, δ2 = δtrap, δ3 = 0, δ4 = 0
|trap3〉 = Rz(3pi/4)|+〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 5pi/4 , θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi, δ2 = −pi/2, δ3 = δtrap, δ4 = pi/2
|trap3〉 = Rz(pi/4)|+〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 7pi/4 , θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi, δ2 = 0, δ3 = δtrap, δ4 = −pi/2
|trap4〉 = |−〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = pi/4, θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi/2, δ2 = 0, δ3 = 5pi/4, δ4 = δtrap
|trap4〉 = |−i〉: θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 3pi/4, θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi/2, δ2 = pi/2, δ3 = 7pi/4, δ4 = δtrap
TABLE V: Blind phases and measurement instructions for the entanglement verification procedure.
FIG. 5: Blind zigzag cluster
Bell inequality of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)-type,
S = |E(α, β)− E(α, β′)|+ |E(α′, β) + E(α′, β′)| ≤ 2, (16)
can be obtained. Here the correlation coefficients are defined as
E(α, β) =
C00(α, β)− C01(α, β)− C10(α, β) + C11(α, β)
C00(α, β) + C01(α, β) + C10(α, β) + C11(α, β)
(17)
and Cij(α, β) are the coincidence counts for obtaining measurement results i = {0, 1} on qubit a and j = {0, 1} on
qubit b for measurements in bases α and β on qubits a and b respectively.
We exploit the framework of blind quantum computing, in order to enable a verifier to perform a blind Bell test.
We choose the blind cluster state to be a zigzag cluster state, shown in Figure 5.
The underlying circuit, which is obtained, when measurements in the basis |±δj 〉 = (|0〉±eiδj |1〉)/
√
2 are performed
on the blind zigzag cluster state with blind qubits being in the state |θj〉 is given by the circuit below
|+〉 • Rz(−δ2 + θ2) H Rz(θ1) δ1
|+〉 Rz(−δ4 + θ4) H • Rz(θ3) δ3
State generation Bell test
(18)
where •• denotes a CPhase gate (CPhase|ij〉 = (−1)ij |ij〉) and φ a measurement in the basis |+φ〉. Here,
Rz(φ) = exp(−iφσz/2), H = (σx + σz)/
√
2 and σx, σy and σz denote the usual Pauli matrices.
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As we will see in the following, a blind Bell test can be implemented by choosing suitable combinations of δj and θj .
For this, the left part of the circuit (shown above) implements the state generation, whereas the right parts realizes
the Bell test.
The verifier can choose between entangled states and product states for the Bell test. For example, by choosing
−δ4 + θ4 = 0 (or pi), the input state will be a product state:
|+〉 • · · ·
⇒
|+〉 • · · ·
|+〉 Rz(0) H • · · · |0〉 • · · ·
(19)
Alternatively, by choosing −δ4 + θ4 = pi/2 (or −pi/2), the input state will be an entangled state:
|+〉 • · · ·
⇒
|+〉 • · · ·
|+〉 Rz(pi/2) H • · · · |−i〉 • · · ·
(20)
This demonstrates that the verifier can choose between different—product or entangled—input states for the Bell test
by choosing different combinations of δ4 and θ4. For our demonstration, we exemplarily choose the entangled state
to be CPhase|+〉|−i〉.
In the blind framework, the Bell measurements are determined by the choice of the blind phases θ1, θ2, and θ3 as
well as by the measurement settings δ1, δ2, and δ3 on the blind zigzag cluster state. For our demonstration, we choose
the Bell measurement angles as given in the main paper.
The Bell settings of α and α′ are determined by the choice of (−δ2 + θ2) and (δ1 − θ1). For the Bell measurement
angle α = pi/2, we choose δ1 − θ1 = pi/2 and −δ2 + θ2 = pi.
|+〉 • Rz(pi) H pi/2 ⇒
|+〉 • Rz(pi) −pi/2
|−i〉 • · · · |−i〉 • · · ·
(21)
which leads to a measurement in the basis α = pi/2 in the upper wire:
⇒
|+〉 • pi/2
|−i〉 • · · ·
(22)
For the Bell measurement angle α′ = σz, we choose δ1 − θ1 = 0. With that configuration, −δ2 + θ2 can have any
value, since a Rz(−δ2 + θ2) rotation does not affect the state |0〉:
|+〉 • Rz(−δ2 + θ2) H 0 ⇒
|+〉 • Rz(−δ2 + θ2) σz
|−i〉 • · · · |−i〉 • · · ·
(23)
Finally, we obtain a measurement in the basis α′ = σz:
⇒
|+〉 • σz
|−i〉 • · · ·
(24)
The angles β and β′ are determined by δ3 and θ3.
|+〉 • · · ·
⇒
|+〉 • · · ·
|−i〉 • Rz(θ3) δ3 |−i〉 • δ3 − θ3
(25)
To choose the Bell settings, β = −3pi/4 and β′ = −pi/4, we simply take δ3 − θ3 to be equal to β or β′.
Experimental measurement settings
In our experiment, we choose the settings given in table VI.
Note, that for the second setting α, β′ we measure α+ pi and β′ + pi instead of α and β′. This has no effect on the
Bell inequality since only the measurement outcomes are exchanged (00 → 11, 01 → 10, 10 → 01, 11 → 00). This
exchange of the measurements outcomes can be interpreted as the verifier choosing rj = 1. In the blind quantum
computing framework, rj is a randomly chosen value in {0, 1} which hides the value of the measurement outcome.
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α, β:
θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = 3pi/4, θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi/2, δ2 = −pi/2, δ3 = 0, δ4 = −pi/2
α, β′:
θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0, θ3 = 3pi/4, θ4 = 0
δ1 = pi/2, δ2 = 0, δ3 = −pi/2, δ4 = −pi/2
α′,β:
θ1 = 0, θ2 = pi/2, θ3 = pi/4 , θ4 = 0
δ1 = 0, δ2 = −pi/2, δ3 = −pi/2, δ4 = −pi/2
α′, β′:
θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0, θ3 = pi/4, θ4 = 0
δ1 = 0, δ2 = 0, δ3 = 0, δ4 = −pi/2
TABLE VI: Blind phases and measurement instructions for the preparation of a set of trap qubits
Bell test verification
In order to show that the Bell test is invariant under errors of the form A ⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗ A, as required to show
verification in our setting, we note that the circuit implemented by our measurement settings is described by the
circuit below.
|+〉 • Rz(−δ2 + θ2) Zm1 H Rz(θ1) Zm1 δ1
|+〉 Rz(−δ4 + θ4) Zm4 H • Rz(θ3) Zm3 δ3
Note that an error of this form flips both m1 and m4. The effect of flipping m1 is trivially identical to flipping
the outcome of the first logical qubit in the Bell test. Although it is not immediately obvious, we note that since
Zm1RZ(−δ4 + θ4) = RZ(±pi2 ) and HZRZ(±pi2 )|+〉 = ZHRZ(±pi2 )|+〉, a bit flip error on m4 leads to a bit flip error in
the outcome of the measurement result for the second logical qubit. Thus all errors of the form A ⊗ C ⊗ C ⊗ A flip
the outcome of both measurements in a Bell test. However, we note that the outcome of the Bell test depends only
on the parity of these two measurements, and hence any inferred value of the CHSH quantity is left unchanged by
such errors.
